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NECESSITY OR OVERREACH? WEIGHING 
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STATE LAW 
INTERPRETATION IN OIL AND GAS 
BANKRUPTCY CASES 
LAURA N. COORDES
*
 
Introduction  
“Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some 
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such 
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party 
is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”
1
 With these words, the United 
States Supreme Court established guidelines for the interaction of state and 
federal law in the bankruptcy context. The Butner principle, as this 
guidance has come to be known, was devised to promote the uniform 
treatment of property interests under both state and federal law.
2
 But in 
striving to establish uniformity in this manner, the Butner principle 
necessarily acknowledges divergent treatment of property interests in 
different bankruptcy courts across the country, to the extent that there is 
                                                                                                             
 * Associate Professor, Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of 
Law. 
 1. Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 2. Rich Mullen, Bankruptcy 101 – Back to Basics with Butner, WEIL BANKR. BLOG 
(Oct. 27, 2011), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/throwback-thursday/ 
bankruptcy-101-back-to-basics-with-butner/ (“The Court reasoned that a uniform treatment 
of property interests by state and federal courts would reduce uncertainty, discourage forum 
shopping and prevent a party from receiving a windfall merely because of a debtor’s 
bankruptcy.”). 
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variation among state property laws.
3
 Such divisions are readily observable 
in oil and gas bankruptcies. 
When an oil and gas company files for bankruptcy, federal bankruptcy 
judges are often confronted with the need to interpret complex, technical, 
and even “arcane” state property laws, due primarily to the interplay 
between property and contract law in these cases.
4
 Courts’ interpretations 
can sometimes produce non-uniform results: a bankruptcy court in one 
instance may conclude that an interpretation of state property law is 
implicated in its interpretation of a debtor’s contract, while another court 
may reach a different conclusion when faced with a very similar contract.
5
 
This lack of uniformity, combined with state law complexity, has led some 
to question whether bankruptcy is the appropriate forum within which to 
resolve these issues.
6
 
Specifically, much ink has been spilled over the proper characterization 
of oil and gas agreements in bankruptcy.
7
 A court’s characterization of an 
oil and gas agreement as a real property conveyance, a lease, or an 
executory contract directly impacts the way the debtor can treat the 
agreement in bankruptcy.
8
 If the court determines that the debtor has 
conveyed a real property interest to another party via the agreement, the 
property conveyed is not part of the bankruptcy estate, and the debtor may 
not assume or reject the agreement in bankruptcy.
9
 In contrast, if the court 
characterizes the agreement as either a lease or an executory contract, the 
agreement may be assumed or rejected by the debtor.
10
 
                                                                                                             
 3. See id. (“In the absence of some specific bankruptcy interest or provision, 
bankruptcy courts will take nonbankruptcy rights as they are found.”). 
 4. Michael P. Pearson, Covenants Running With the Land, 48 ST MARYS L.J. 727, 785 
(2017). 
 5. See generally Wayne C. Byers & Timothy N. Tuggey, Oil and Gas Leases and 
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Uniform Approach, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 337 (1989). 
 6. Shereen Jennifer Panahi, “Dedication of Production” Clauses: Challenges in 
Ascertaining Interests in Natural Gas Gathering and Processing Agreements in Bankruptcy, 
9 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 189, 193 (2019) (discussing jurisdictional issues). 
 7. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 5 at 337 (“The wave of bankruptcies among oil and gas 
concerns…has made the application of section 365 to the various instruments commonly 
employed in the industry a very significant issue.”). 
 8. Charles Persons, Drilling Down: A Deeper Look into the Distressed Oil & Gas 
Industry Part 3 - The Ability to Assume or Reject Oil and Gas Leases, WEIL BANKR. BLOG 
(2015), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/energy-sector/drilling-down-a-
deeper-look-into-the-distressed-oil-gas-industry-part-3-the-ability-to-assume-or-reject-oil-
and-gas-leases/ (last visited Feb 24, 2020). 
 9. 11 U.S.C. §541 (defining property of the bankruptcy estate). 
 10. 11 U.S.C. §365. 
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Although the proper characterization of oil and gas agreements is indeed 
unclear, this Article contends that many of the problems commonly 
associated with this characterization are perhaps not as severe as they might 
first appear. In particular, it examines three issues that scholars and 
observers have identified arising from the interplay of federal and state law 
in oil and gas bankruptcies.  
The first, and likely most prominent, issue is the lack of uniform 
treatment of these agreements in bankruptcy. As illustrated by the Butner 
principle, bankruptcy law presumes that federal courts will generally 
respect state-created property interests. This principle creates a sort of 
“vertical uniformity”: a party to a bankruptcy case can expect that their 
property interests will, by and large, receive the same treatment under both 
state law and federal bankruptcy law. Deference to state law, however, also 
means that there is no “horizontal uniformity” in bankruptcy cases. In other 
words, a party’s outcome in bankruptcy will vary depending on the state 
law the bankruptcy court is applying.  
In the oil and gas context, there are concerns about lack of both types of 
uniformity.
11
 Bankruptcy courts may vary in their determination as to 
whether state law applies. In addition, a bankruptcy court applying the law 
of one state may well reach a different conclusion than if it had applied 
another state’s law. From a bankruptcy perspective, only the first of these 
uniformity problems can be resolved.  The second uniformity problem will 
only be resolved if all 50 states adopt uniform property laws. 
After exploring lack of uniformity, the Article proceeds to talk about a 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to address the state-law issues raised in an 
oil and gas bankruptcy case. Although some have questioned whether 
bankruptcy courts properly have jurisdiction to address these issues,
12
 this 
Article contends that often, there is no practical choice but for bankruptcy 
courts to address these issues as and when they arise. Indeed, although 
jurisdictional questions are often difficult to resolve in the bankruptcy 
context, the Butner principle does contemplate that bankruptcy courts will 
hear and decide issues relating to state law when those issues are implicated 
in decisions relating to the bankruptcy case. 
                                                                                                             
 11. See, e.g., Byers & Tuggey, supra note 5 at 338 (observing that “the current 
treatment of oil and gas leases in bankruptcy offers little certainty”); Panahi, supra note 6 at 
193 (“[M]any bankruptcy judges have not hesitated to opine on the state law (i.e., non-core) 
matters, potentially creating more confusion and inhibiting uniformity in the application and 
interpretation of state laws”). 
 12. Panahi, supra note 6 at 193 (summarizing the debate in this area). 
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Finally, the Article seeks to illuminate the impact of bankruptcy court 
oil-and-gas decisions. The Article suggests that the overall impact of 
bankruptcy court decisions about oil and gas contracts may well be minimal 
on a practical level. Among other things, oil and gas bankruptcies are 
highly fact-specific and, consequently, readily distinguishable from each 
other. In addition, as explained below, all parties may be motivated not to 
bring issues surrounding oil and gas contracts to the bankruptcy court. 
This Article’s exploration of concerns about uniformity, jurisdiction, and 
impact helps put these concerns into context and illustrates that, despite 
these concerns, bankruptcy law may still be a desirable and at times 
necessary forum for oil and gas industry players. The Article proceeds as 
follows. Part I provides general background on oil and gas bankruptcies and 
on the particular subject that is this Article’s focus: a debtor’s ability to 
assume or reject oil and gas-related agreements in bankruptcy. Part II 
explores each of the three issues surrounding this subject in depth, while 
Part III concludes by summarizing the place of these three issues within the 
broader framework for oil and gas bankruptcy analysis. 
I. Background 
This Part first explores the current state of the oil and gas industry. As 
Subpart A describes, for various reasons, the oil and gas industry is in a 
slump. This suggests that bankruptcy may well be on the horizon for many 
companies. Subpart B then introduces a key question a bankruptcy court 
may face when a company in the oil and gas industry files for bankruptcy: 
can the company assume or reject certain agreements it entered into prior to 
the bankruptcy filing? 
A. Rising Industry Distress 
Oil and gas bankruptcies are on the rise, and industry news suggests that 
the number of oil and gas bankruptcies is likely to continue to grow in the 
near future. In 2019, the number of oil and gas bankruptcies in the U.S. and 
Canada rose 50% over the previous year, and experts predict a continued 
increase in the number of bankruptcies as energy prices decline due to a 
global oil surplus.
13
 From 2015 to 2019, 208 oil and gas production 
companies filed for bankruptcy.
14
 
                                                                                                             
 13. U.S., Canadian Oil Company Bankruptcies Surge 50% in 2019: Report, REUTERS 
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/north-american-oil-company-bankruptcies-
184043339.html. 
 14. Id. 
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Although producers have certainly been hit hard, the effects of the 
industry slump have not been limited to production companies. For 
example, oilfield service company bankruptcies almost doubled from 2018 
to 2019, rising from 12 to 21 in just a year.
15
 A notable oilfield service 
company bankruptcy was Weatherford International, which filed for 
bankruptcy in July of 2019, listing $8.3 billion in total debts.
16
  
Although midstream companies have fared better, even they are not 
completely spared: two midstream companies filed for bankruptcy in 2019, 
and 28 have filed since the beginning of 2015.
17
 Overall, experts predict 
that as many as 40 oil and natural gas companies could file for bankruptcy 
in 2020 in the United States alone.
18
 
The oil and gas bankruptcy boom is reflective of the energy industry as a 
whole. According to analysts, 50 energy companies filed for bankruptcy 
during the first nine months of 2019, “including 33 oil and gas producers, 
15 oilfield services companies and two midstream companies.”
19
 By 
comparison, just 43 oil and gas companies filed for bankruptcy during all of 
2018.
20
 Indeed, the energy sector leads all other sectors with the highest 
number of distressed companies.
21
 
The collapse of oil prices and the bankruptcies of major industry players 
have also impacted suppliers and employees. Since 2019, the oilfield 
services sector has lost nearly 13% of its workforce.
22
 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. 
 16. Olivia Pulsinelli, Weatherford Files $8.3B Bankruptcy in Houston, HOUSTON BUS. J. 
(Jul. 1, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2019/07/01/weatherford-files-8-
3b-bankruptcy-in-houston.html. 
 17. U.S., Canadian Oil Company Bankruptcies Surge 50% in 2019: Report, REUTERS 
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/north-american-oil-company-bankruptcies-
184043339.html. 
 18. Sayer Devlin & Christine Buurma, Oil Patch May See 40 U.S. Bankruptcies This 
Year, Law Firm Says, BLOOMBERG BANKR. L. NEWS (Jan. 24, 2020). 
 19. Alex Kimani, 2020: The Year of the Oil Bankruptcies, OILPRICE.COM (Dec. 27, 
2019), https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/2020-The-Year-Of-The-Oil-
Bankruptcies.html. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. David Wethe & Reg Gale, Oil’s Collapse is Taking an Entire Service Industry 
Down With It, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/exp/ 
eyJjdHh0IjoiQktOVyIsImlkIjoiMDAwMDAxNzEtODJkOS1kMmFiLWE1ZjEtODdkZDIx
YjUwMDAwIiwic2lnIjoia3BHeG5tcUxQSXJ2anJqeGlacktsaHgzUCt3PSIsInRpbWUiOiIx
NTg3MDQwMTE3IiwidXVpZCI6ImFSNXJwdkhmKy9CZnpVOWVLeWthVVE9PS9ieFd
JS0lCUHprK0VSVXVnc3Q3bnc9PSIsInYiOiIxIn0=?usertype=External&bwid=00000171-
82d9-d2ab-a5f1-87dd21b50000&qid=6892596&cti=LSCH&uc=1320015811&et=CURAT 
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The COVID-19 global pandemic has hit the oil industry particularly 
hard. In response to expanding supply and lower crude prices, explorers 
across the United States have begun shutting down drilling rigs.
23
 A survey 
by the Kansas City Federal Reserve found that almost 40% of oil and 
natural gas producers will become insolvent sometime in 2020 if crude 
prices remain at current levels.
24
 During the first quarter of 2020, eight 
oilfield service companies, representing a total of $10.9 billion of debt, filed 
for chapter 11 bankruptcy.
25
 
Even large companies are not immune from the current crisis. In April of 
2020, Marathon Petroleum Corporation became the first U.S. facility to 
shut down due to the coronavirus pandemic when it idled its Gallup, New 
Mexico refinery.
26
 Across the country, banks are gearing up to operate oil 
and gas fields in order to avoid losses on loans they extended.
27
 Although 
the federal government and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) have taken some measures to help ease the crisis for the 
energy sector, many fear that those measures will not be enough.
28
 In a 
recent survey by the Dallas Federal Reserve, several large producers 
appeared to call for more government intervention.
29
 Oil prices crashed 
                                                                                                             
ED_HIGHLIGHTS&emc=bbknw_hlt%3A1&context=email&email=00000171-82c4-dadf-
a1f3-a6edcc740000. 
 23. Joe Carroll, Sayer Devlin & David Wethe, Oil-Industry Collapse Accelerates as 
Scores of Rigs Go Dark (1), BLOOMBERG LAW (2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
document/X49CPJD0000000?udv_expired=true (last visited Apr 14, 2020). 
 24. Rachel Adams-Heard & Catarina Saraiva, Oil Companies Warn Kansas City Fed of 
Widespread Insolvencies, BLOOMBERG LAW (2020) (last visited Apr 14, 2020). 
 25. Sergio Chapa, Service companies lead energy bankruptcy filings so far this year, 
HOUSTONCHRONICLE.COM (2020), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/ 
article/Service-companies-lead-energy-bankruptcy-filings-15184036.php (last visited Apr 
14, 2020) (noting that this was an increase over six companies during the fourth quarter of 
2019). 
 26. Barbara J. Powell & David Marino, Some of America’s Oil Refineries May Be on 
Brink of Shutting (1), BLOOMBERG LAW (2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
X88EQT2G000000? (last visited Apr 14, 2020). 
 27. David French & Imani Moise, Exclusive: U.S. banks prepare to seize energy assets 
as shale boom goes bust, REUTERS, April 10, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
banks-energy-assets-exclusive-idUSKCN21R3JI (last visited Apr 14, 2020) (citing 
JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Citigroup as examples of lenders 
setting up companies to own and manage oil and gas assets). 
 28. Kalyeena Makortoff, Oil Prices Fall Again Despite Opec+ Deal to Cut Production, 
THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/10/opec-
russia-reduce-oil-production-prop-up-prices. 
 29. David Gaffen, ‘Survival Mode’ – Oil Patch Workers Let It All Hang Out in Post-
Crash Fallas Fed Survey, REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/global-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss1/2
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below $0 in April of 2020 for the first time ever,
30
 and the Department of 
Energy has begun work on a plan that would compensate U.S. oil producers 
for not producing in the near future.
31
 In short, “[a] tidal wave of 
bankruptcies is about to hit” the oil and gas industry.
32
 
B. Classification of Oil and Gas Contracts 
If and when oil and gas companies begin to file, “[t]he real issue behind 
bankruptcy is going to be breach of contract. Everybody is going to be in 
breach.”
33
 Indeed, a major issue in many oil and gas bankruptcies involves 
the classification of various contracts in the bankruptcy case. Specifically, 
the U.S. oil and gas industry is “highly dependent upon an intricate set of 
agreements that allow oil and gas to be gathered from privately owned 
land.”
34
 The classification issue became increasingly important after energy 
commodity prices collapsed in 2014, leaving producers to reduce or 
suspend oil and gas drilling operations.
35
 As production declined, many 
producers were forced to make large deficiency payments under their 
agreements with midstream companies.
36
 Producers that could not 
restructure these agreements to reduce or eliminate deficiency payments 
                                                                                                             
oil-texas/survival-mode-oil-patch-workers-let-it-all-hang-out-in-post-crash-dallas-fed-
survey-idUSL1N2BI2OQ. 
 30. Stephanie Kelly, Oil Price Crashes into Negative Territory for the First Time in 
History Amid Pandemic, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
global-oil/oil-falls-on-concern-over-storage-and-earnings-idUSKBN2210V9. 
 31. Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Sheela Tobben, U.S. Weighs Paying Drillers to Leave Oil in 
Ground Amid Glut, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2020-04-15/u-s-weighs-paying-drillers-to-leave-oil-in-the-ground-amid-glut. 
 32. Jordan Fabian & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Trump Vows Oil Rescue That He’s Been 
Powerless to Deliver, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 21, 2020) (quoting the chief executive of 
Canary Drilling Services, an oilfield services company). 
 33. Jeremy Hill & Nicole Bullock, DISTRESSED DAILY: Bankruptcy in the Time of 
Negative Oil, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 21, 2020) (quoting Professor Jonathan Lipson, who 
was speaking about the expected wave of bankruptcy filings by companies hurt by the 
coronavirus). 
 34. Fredric Sosnick et al., Midstream Companies Have Renewed Hope: Running-With-
The-Land Oil and Gas Dedication Survives a Bankruptcy Challenge, Offering Precedent in 
Contra to Sabine, SHEARMAN & STERLING PERSPECTIVES (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://i.emlfiles4.com/cmpdoc/8/7/4/8/2/2/files/9697_doc-6-nov.pdf?dm_i=4WAM,8O87, 
19L67L,WNLW,1. 
 35. Pearson, supra note 4 at 731. 
 36. Id. 
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often ended up in bankruptcy, trying to reject
37
 their most burdensome 
contracts.
38
 Midstream companies, the contractual counterparties, strongly 
objected to the debtor-producer’s rejection of the contracts, arguing that 
these contracts contained covenants running with the land, thus creating 
property interests that bankruptcy law could not terminate.
39
 
To understand these arguments, it is important to consider how 
bankruptcy law differentiates between contract rights and property rights. 
Bankruptcy law allows the debtor to assume (that is, remain a party to) or 
reject executory contracts or unexpired leases.
40
 Like many other areas of 
law, bankruptcy law elevates substance over form, meaning that merely 
labeling an agreement a “lease” does not necessarily mean that it will be 
classified as a lease in bankruptcy court.
41
 In the oil and gas context, 
although oil and gas contracts may be labeled as “leases,” in substance, 
these agreements are often more akin to conveyances of real property 
interests in fee simple.
42
 If an oil and gas “lease” is, in reality, a conveyance 
of real property interests, those interests cannot be terminated in 
bankruptcy, as they will have been conveyed by the debtor prior to the 
bankruptcy case.
43
 
Thus, the classification of an oil and gas lease in a bankruptcy case 
involves an examination of the substance of the agreement, which in turn 
frequently invokes difficult questions of both state and federal law. 
Although bankruptcy law generally defers to property interests created 
under state law, some courts have held that the question of whether an 
agreement is an “executory contract” is firmly within the province of 
bankruptcy law. Thus, the extent to which courts refer to state property law 
                                                                                                             
 37. “Rejection” of a contract in bankruptcy means that the debtor breaches the contract. 
The claim is treated as a pre-petition claim, meaning that it may be paid only cents on the 
dollar. See 11 U.S.C. §365(g). 
 38. Pearson, supra note 4 at 731-32. 
 39. Id. at 732. 
 40. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (allowing the trustee or debtor-in-possession to assume, assign, 
or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases with the bankruptcy court’s approval); 
Daniel Tavera, A Purchase or a Loan? Rethinking the Transactions Private Equity-Backed 
Oil and Gas Companies Encounter in Uncharted Waters, 5 OIL & GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENERGY J. 41, 42 (2019). 
 41. Tavera, supra note 40 at 54 (“In adopting the [Bankruptcy] Code, Congress 
intended for courts to examine the true substance of the transaction on a case-by-case basis 
to discover if a lease is a true lease or a financing instrument.”). 
 42. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 5 at 337-38 (summarizing different approaches to 
classifying oil and gas leases). 
 43. Pearson, supra note 4 at 732. 
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to characterize the substance of an agreement varies and may depend on 
how each court interprets an “executory contract.”
44
  
Making matters worse, there is no “coherent approach” in bankruptcy as 
to what it means for a contract to be “executory.”
45
 Although many courts 
use the Countryman test to determine whether a contract is executory,
46
 
others have recognized the limitations of this test and sought alternate 
definitions.
47
 
Oil and gas leases can sometimes fall within a gray area, making them 
difficult to classify. Under the terms of many oil and gas leases, some oil 
and gas interests revert back to the mineral interest owner upon failure to 
meet specific terms and conditions.
48
 This is a conditional conveyance, 
classified either as “a freehold conveyance with a reversionary interest in 
favor of the original owner or as a leasehold conveyance.”
49
 If a bankruptcy 
is filed after the conveyance of the working interest but before oil and gas 
has been produced, a court may hold that the agreement is an executory 
contract.
50
 However, some jurisdictions, such as Texas, provide that an oil 
and gas interest vests in the lessee upon conveyance.
51
 In these instances, 
the agreement would not be executory, as the interest has already vested.
52
 
Courts in Oklahoma and New Mexico are among those that have held 
that § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code—the provision used by the debtor to 
assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases—does not apply 
to oil and gas leases.
53
 For example, in In re Heston Oil Co., the District 
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma held that § 365 did not apply 
                                                                                                             
 44. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 5 at 337-338; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional 
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 316 n. 372 (1989) (noting divisions 
among courts as to the status of an oil and gas lease). 
 45. ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: 
TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS  578 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 7th ed., 2014). 
 46. The Countryman test provides that a contract is executory if “the obligation of both 
the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of 
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance 
of the other.” Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 460 (1973). 
 47. See, e.g., In re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. 417 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that the 
Countryman definition does not resolve classification questions for certain contracts, such as 
options agreements). 
 48. Persons, supra note 8. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 5 at 350 (citing cases). 
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to an Oklahoma oil and gas lease because it was neither an “executory 
contract” nor an “unexpired lease.”
54
 The court first analyzed the property 
rights created under Oklahoma law by an oil and gas lease to determine that 
the so-called “lease” could not qualify as an “unexpired lease” under § 365 
because “[t]he interests arising from an oil and gas lease are more akin to a 
profit a prendre and are generally considered as estates in real property 
having the nature of a fee.”
55
 It then determined that the parties did not have 
significant material outstanding obligations under the agreement so as to 
render it “executory.”
56
 
Not all courts have followed this reasoning, however. Notably, a New 
York bankruptcy judge in 2016 allowed a Texas oil and gas producer to 
reject its future volume obligations under gas gathering contracts with two 
gathering companies.
57
 Although the court in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. 
noted that it lacked authority to determine whether the agreements were 
subject to rejection in the context in which the issue arose, it did issue a 
preliminary ruling that concluded that the gathering agreements did not 
create real property interests under Texas law and that the debtors could 
therefore reject those agreements.
58
  
Other cases seem to point to a different outcome than the one reached by 
the Sabine court.
59
 And much seems to depend on the language of the 
agreement itself: for example, in Newco v. Energytec, Inc., the Fifth Circuit 
carefully examined the language of a gas gathering agreement in order to 
determine that a covenant ran with the land, which in turn indicated the 
creation of a real property interest.
60
 More recently, the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Colorado applied Utah law to determine that 
                                                                                                             
 54. In re Heston Oil Co., 69 Bankr. 34 (N.D. Okla. 1986). 
 55. Id. at 36. 
 56. Id. 
 57. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., American Refining Co. v. Tidal Western Oil Corp., 264 S.W. 335, 340 
(Tex. Cit. App. 1924) (“The fact that gas in transit from its place under ground must pass 
through artificial conduits before it can be utilized does not, as a general rule, change its 
character from real to personal property.”);  Montfort v. Trek Resources, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 
344 (Tex. Civ. App. 2006) (holding that a covenant requiring oil and gas leasehold estate 
owner to furnish water to surface owner was a covenant that touched and concerned the 
land). 
 60. Newco Energy v. Energytec, Inc. (In re Energyte, Inc.), 739 F.3d 215, 221-25 (5th 
Cir. 2013). 
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midstream gas and gathering processing and saltwater disposal contracts 
constituted covenants running with the land.
61
 
In short, courts are all over the map in their approaches to whether an oil 
and gas agreement may be treated as an executory contract or unexpired 
lease in bankruptcy, and there may be variation even when they are 
applying the same state’s law. The case law’s lack of consistency has not 
escaped scholarly notice.
62
 To examine the classification debate from a 
different angle, this Article focuses on three particular “side effects” arising 
from the classification problem.  
The first of these “side effects” is the lack of uniformity. Because 
bankruptcy courts take different approaches to analyzing oil and gas 
agreements, cases that involve similar documents can have divergent 
outcomes. It is safe to say that there is no uniform approach to classifying 
an oil and gas agreement and little consensus on the extent to which 
bankruptcy law concerns outweigh those of state property law.
63
 
The second “side effect” relates to the jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy 
courts to hear and decide what may be effectively considered state law 
issues. Because oil and gas agreements often require resort to state property 
law, some have contended that their interpretation is properly left to the 
states.
64
  
The final “side effect” concerns the impact bankruptcy cases have on the 
oil and gas industry more generally. Notably, when the Sabine case was 
                                                                                                             
 61. Fredric Sosnick et al., Midstream Companies Have Renewed Hope: Running-with-
the-land Oil and Gas Dedication Survives a Bankruptcy Challenge, Offering Precedent in 
Contra to Sabine, SHEARMAN & STERLING PERSPECTIVES (Oct. 18, 2019). 
 62. See Part II.A, infra. 
 63. See generally Byers & Tuggey, supra note 5 (proposing a uniform approach to 
addressing the applicability of §365 to oil and gas leases); see also Richard L. Epling, Oil 
and Gas Rights in Bankruptcy: Beware the Many Pitfalls for Interest Holders and Creators, 
74 BUS. LAWYER 127, 139 (2018) ("The tangle of state lien laws relating to oil and gas 
production is a thicket of non-uniform provisions that vary from state to state and provides a 
potential trap for the unwary whether they be secured lenders, suppliers, gathering 
companies, or the producers themselves."); Tavera, supra note 40 at 42-43 ("In the oil and 
gas industry, a bankruptcy court's inability to uniformly define the interests under state law 
for oil and gas leases or conveyances causes significant confusion."); Panahi, supra note 6 at 
199-200 (noting that "the need for uniform resolution on the real property implications of 
'dedications of production' is more pertinent than ever"). 
 64. Panahi, supra note 6 at 193 (“Despite…jurisdictional questions, many bankruptcy 
judges have not hesitated to opine on the state law (i.e., non-core) matters, potentially 
creating more confusion and inhibiting uniformity in the application and interpretation of 
state laws.”). 
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decided in 2016, it shocked the industry.
65
 Should a New York bankruptcy 
judge issuing a non-binding interpretation of Texas law be able to 
significantly influence the way oil and gas agreements are structured?
66
 Or 
were these shock waves merely temporary? The next Part turns to these and 
other questions. 
II. Analysis 
Although oil and gas bankruptcies can raise many issues, the 
characterization of oil and gas contracts and leases in bankruptcy has often 
been a primary focus. As bankruptcies rise in the oil and gas sector, this 
issue may well become more salient. This Part analyzes three issues related 
to a bankruptcy court’s characterization of an oil and gas agreement: (1) the 
lack of uniformity in this area of the law; (2) whether bankruptcy courts 
have jurisdiction to decide these issues; and (3) the impact a bankruptcy 
judge’s decision may have in the future. All three of these issues are 
implicated in the larger question of how to characterize an oil and gas 
“lease.” 
A. Uniformity 
The characterization of an oil and gas agreement in bankruptcy raises 
questions about the interplay between state and federal law. Because state 
property laws vary, transactions that are identical in substance may be 
treated differently depending on the jurisdiction in which they occur.
67
 In 
contrast, bankruptcy law is designed to be applied uniformly across the 
United States.
68
 Yet, the Butner principle suggests that in general, 
bankruptcy law should defer to state property law. Thus, in practice, 
bankruptcy cases involving substantially similar oil and gas agreements can 
also vary depending on the jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                             
 65. Ken W. Irvin & David E. Kronenberg, Sabine Oil & Gas and its Effect on Oil and 
Gas Gatherers: Existential Threat or Flash in the Pan?, 26 NO. 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. NL 
ART. 2 (2017) (“Many commentators initially viewed the ruling as a potential threat to oil 
and gas gatherers, a critical link in the nationwide oil and gas transportation network.”). 
 66. Pearson, supra note 4 at 777-78 (“When viewed logically, the Sabine Cases have 
had a more wide-ranging impact than they should have as decisions by a bankruptcy court 
sitting in New York interpreting Texas law….[T]he cases have generated an enormous 
amount of interest and commentary.”). 
 67. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 5 at 351 (“[I]t makes very little sense for substantially 
identical transactions to produce vastly divergent consequences under the Bankruptcy 
Code.”) (emphasis in original).  
 68. See U.S. Const. Art. I, s.8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress to enact “uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
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As referenced in the Introduction, bankruptcy’s deference to state 
property law stems from the principle articulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Butner v. United States. Butner provides that bankruptcy law 
respects state property entitlements unless an overwhelming federal interest 
demands a different result.
69
 Although a contract may be considered 
property, bankruptcy law treats contractual rights differently than property 
rights. Indeed, Congress created specific provisions in the Bankruptcy Code 
to allow contract rights to be modified in bankruptcy,
70
 with the result that a 
key benefit of bankruptcy is the ability to reject contracts and pay 
counterparties only a fraction of the damage claims.
71
 Practically speaking, 
bankruptcy draws a line between contract rights and property rights: debtors 
can break contracts in bankruptcy with fewer consequences than they would 
face under non-bankruptcy (state) law, but debtors, in general, must respect 
state-created property rights, even in bankruptcy court. 
This means that although bankruptcy law applies uniformly across the 50 
states, when state laws characterize property interests differently, as many 
do in the oil and gas context, bankruptcy can impact similar oil and gas 
conveyances differently depending on the state.  
As discussed, some observers have criticized the lack of uniform results 
in oil and gas bankruptcies. Lack of uniformity results from two primary 
causes. As just discussed, lack of uniformity can arise from variances in 
state law. This particular lack of uniformity is due to nonuniform state laws, 
not to nonuniform application of bankruptcy principles to those laws.
72
 This 
lack of uniformity is not a bankruptcy-specific problem and would only be 
resolved if states amended their property laws to be uniform. 
                                                                                                             
 69. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and 
defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no 
reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party 
is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”). 
 70. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2005). 
 71. Tom Califano et al., COVID-19: The Benefits of US Chapter 11 Relief in a Time of 
Economic Crisis, DLA PIPER (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/ 
publications/2020/03/benefits-of-chapter-11-to-companies-in-crisis/ (“[T]he Bankruptcy 
Code allows debtors to receive the benefits of their existing executory contracts while 
determining which contracts will survive the bankruptcy and, upon rejecting burdensome 
contracts, become free from continued performance obligations which may no longer be 
commercially attractive.”). 
 72. See Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (“The laws passed on 
the subject [of bankruptcy] must, however, be uniform throughout the United States, but that 
uniformity is geographical, and not personal.”). 
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However, lack of uniformity also results due to the varying approaches 
bankruptcy courts take to addressing questions about the proper 
characterization of oil and gas conveyances. In other words, bankruptcy 
courts themselves disagree over whether agreements concerning oil and gas 
interests primarily concern contract rights or property rights. This particular 
lack of uniformity arises at the bankruptcy level and, although it may have 
some relation to the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of state law, it may 
also have little to do with variances in state laws themselves. 
In their 1989 article, Oil and Gas Leases and Section 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code: A Uniform Approach, Wayne Byers and Timothy 
Tuggey described three primary approaches courts have taken to address 
whether oil and gas leases can be treated as executory contracts or 
unexpired leases in bankruptcy.
73
 Some courts take the view that the 
treatment of an oil and gas lease in bankruptcy depends entirely on state oil 
and gas law.
74
 These courts might defer heavily to state law, applying 
bankruptcy principles only after they have carefully ascertained how the 
agreement would be characterized by the state in question. 
A second group of courts has taken the position that §365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code applies to all oil and gas leases.
75
 These courts start with 
a broader definition of executory contract that would seem to encompass all 
state law characterizations of these conveyances.
76
 Finally, a third group of 
courts has reached the opposite conclusion, holding that oil and gas 
conveyances generally do not fall within §365’s scope.
77
 These courts may 
spend less time examining state law and more time looking at other 
bankruptcy courts’ characterizations of §365’s scope.
78
  
Thus, the uniformity problem in bankruptcy is not limited to state law 
differences. Instead, differences in how courts interpret both state and 
federal bankruptcy law can generate entirely different results as well. 
Courts that take a monoline position on oil and gas conveyances arguably 
provide more “uniform” treatment of these transactions across different 
cases falling within the same court. However, as discussed, not all courts 
take the same approach, and some courts take polar opposite approaches. 
And of course, the courts that do rely heavily on state laws attain vastly 
different results depending on the state. As an example, take Texas and 
                                                                                                             
 73. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 5 at 337. 
 74. Id. at 337-38. 
 75. Id. at 338. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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Oklahoma, two neighboring states with different approaches to oil and gas-
related property interests. Texas law embraces “ownership-in-place,” a 
theory under which the surface owner also owns the oil and gas beneath the 
land.
79
 If oil and gas migrate from beneath the tract, the ownership interest 
is subject to divestment.
80
 In ownership-in-place states, a “lease” of oil and 
gas is, in substance, “the sale of a fee interest in the oil and gas in place.”
81
 
By contrast, Oklahoma follows a “nonownership” theory, under which 
the surface owner has only the right to explore for and develop gas on the 
tract.
82
 Thus, in Oklahoma, oil and gas is not “owned” until is it is 
produced.
83
 In Oklahoma and other nonownership states, an oil and gas 
lease transfers only the right to search for and produce oil and gas from the 
tract.
84
  
In both ownership-in-place and nonownership states, the lessee will own 
any oil and gas produced (subject to an obligation to pay royalties to the 
lessor); however, if a company files for bankruptcy before any oil and gas is 
produced, the laws in Texas and Oklahoma point to different results.
85
 As 
one commentator has observed,“[t]he tangle of state lien laws relating to oil 
and gas production is a thicket of non-uniform provisions that vary from 
state to state and provide a potential trap for the unwary.”
86
 
When an oil and gas company files for bankruptcy, “[a] bankruptcy 
court’s inability to uniformly define the interests under state law for oil and 
gas leases or conveyances causes significant confusion.”
87
 Some 
commentators have observed that the bankruptcy courts’ practice of relying 
on state law to classify the rights in an oil and gas conveyance produces 
“disparate results.”
88
 But, this reliance is exactly what the Supreme Court 
has called for bankruptcy courts to do in Butner. And the alternative, 
bankruptcy courts disregarding state law property interests, is not a 
guarantee of uniform results, either.  
Broadly speaking, a bankruptcy court faced with characterizing an oil 
and gas agreement for purposes of determining the debtor’s ability to 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. at 339. 
 80. Id. at 338. 
 81. Id. at 339. 
 82. Id. at 340. 
 83. Id. at 338. 
 84. Id. at 340. 
 85. Id. at 341. 
 86. Epling, supra, note 63 at 139. 
 87. Tavera, supra note 40 at 42-43. 
 88. Id. at 55. 
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assume or reject it may choose from two competing approaches. The court 
can either use state law to help it characterize the agreement or disregard 
state law nuances by simply determining that bankruptcy law does (or does 
not) apply to all agreements of the type it is facing. To achieve greater 
uniformity in this area, Congress could amend §365 of the Bankruptcy 
Code to give more explicit direction to bankruptcy courts by, for example, 
explicitly stating that oil and gas conveyances are all executory (or not).  
However, such a blanket approach would sacrifice attention to the 
particular details of each agreement. Typically, bankruptcy elevates 
substance over form, and a blanket approach arguably would disregard 
substance in order to promote uniformity. Furthermore, Butner clearly 
indicates that unless a federal interest requires a different result, property 
issues should be resolved by reference to state law. It is not clear in this 
context that federal law does require a different result; at the very least, 
courts can disagree over whether this is the case, making an argument that 
there is a strong federal interest in uniformity tenuous here. Arguably, state 
law should matter in the characterization of oil and gas-related property 
agreements, since bankruptcy generally takes state property law as it finds 
it.
89
 
In conclusion, both Butner and the principle of elevating substance over 
form seem to indicate that it is generally desirable for bankruptcy courts to 
use state law characterizations of oil and gas agreements in their own 
interpretations. However, requiring bankruptcy courts to take a close look at 
state law raises questions about jurisdiction. Namely, can or should 
bankruptcy courts interpret and apply intricate state-created property laws? 
This question is taken up in the next section. 
B. Jurisdiction 
Because, as just discussed, a determination of whether an oil and gas 
agreement is a lease or an executory contract in bankruptcy may invoke 
questions of state law, oil and gas bankruptcies also give rise to questions 
that can broadly be classified as “jurisdictional” in nature. For example, is it 
proper for federal bankruptcy judges to opine on intricate and extremely 
technical state law matters, such as the property issues oil and gas interests 
                                                                                                             
 89. Charles Persons, Drilling Down: A Deeper Look into the Distressed Oil & Gas 
Industry Part 3 – The Ability to Assume or Reject Oil and Gas Leases, WEIL BANKRUPTCY 
BLOG, Feb. 5, 2015; see also Zachary D. Bombatch, Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Leases in 
Bankruptcy: Rejection Should Occur Only Before Production, 16 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 267, 272 
(2014) (noting that state law determines how to characterize an oil and gas lease as a true 
lease versus a conveyance of real property). 
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necessarily implicate? Are these matters “core” proceedings, which a 
bankruptcy court can decide, or are they “non-core,” meaning that a 
bankruptcy judge can only issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law to the district court?
90
  
Responses to these concerns raise two primary points. First, the dividing 
line between core and non-core proceedings is often blurry.
91
 In some cases, 
issues may raise questions that present a mix of considerations. Notably, 
“whether midstream agreements qualify as executory contracts under the 
Bankruptcy Code remains ‘a question of federal law,’ and yet whether they 
create ‘a real property interest…is a question of state law.’”
92
 Put 
differently, the determination of whether an agreement is an executory 
contract appears to be a core issue—an issue arising squarely in a 
bankruptcy case. But resolving the questions necessary to decide this core 
issue can involve asking how state law would characterize these 
agreements, and that question seems more like a non-core matter.  
Secondly, as a practical matter, many bankruptcy judges must hear and 
decide non-core state law matters with some regularity.
93
 And practically 
speaking, bankruptcy courts may finally adjudicate non-core issues with the 
parties’ consent.
94
  Although commentators have lamented that bankruptcy 
court opinions about state property law issues “creat[e] more confusion and 
inhibit[] uniformity in the application and interpretation of state laws,”
95
 
addressing questions of state law may be a necessary side effect of 
resolving core issues that come before the bankruptcy court.  
                                                                                                             
 90. These questions might more accurately be divided into questions of jurisdiction 
(state vs. federal courts) and allocation among the federal bench (bankruptcy vs. district 
court judges). For more on this topic, see WARREN ET AL., supra note 45 at pp. 853-54, 860-
63. 
 91. Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 33 (2014) (“It is the 
bankruptcy court’s responsibility to determine whether each claim before it is core or non-
core.”); Panahi, supra note 6 at 193 (“The substantial case law addressing the issue of which 
non-core matters bankruptcy judges may properly hear indicates that this question continues 
to present challenges to bankruptcy participants.”). 
 92. Panahi, supra note 6 at 193 (quoting In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 74 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)). 
 93. Panahi, supra note 6 at 193 (noting that “many bankruptcy judges have not hesitated 
to opine on…state law (i.e., non-core) matters”). 
 94. Arkison, 573 at 34 (“If all parties ‘consent,’ the statute permits the bankruptcy judge 
‘to hear and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments’ as if the proceeding 
were core.”), quoting 11 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). 
 95. Panahi, supra note 6 at 193. 
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A bankruptcy judge asked to classify an agreement conveying oil and gas 
interests must determine whether it is proper for the court to finally 
adjudicate these issues, even though there is little clear guidance in this 
area.
96
 Bankruptcy courts are Article I courts, meaning they have only the 
jurisdiction Congress vests in them via statute.
97
 For this reason, some 
scholars have argued that bankruptcy courts cannot exercise authority 
beyond what Congress has specifically granted.
98
 In contrast, others believe 
bankruptcy courts have substantially more flexibility.
99
  
A bankruptcy judge faced with classifying an oil and gas conveyance 
thus may find that they are between a rock and a hard place. Giving even a 
non-binding opinion may be considered by some too great an intrusion into 
state law concerns.
100
 Yet, providing an opinion on how the debtor may 
treat an oil and gas conveyance can also provide clarity and certainty to the 
parties, allowing them to move forward with the bankruptcy case. Such 
clarity and certainty may be particularly valuable in a bankruptcy where the 
debtor is pressed for time.
101
 Returning to bankruptcy only after the 
question has been litigated in state court is not a viable option for many 
companies in bankruptcy. 
Once again, it is important to return to the Butner principle, which 
contemplates that state law matters will arise in the natural course of 
                                                                                                             
 96. See Panahi, supra note 6 at 193 (observing that “the bankruptcy judge in Sabine had 
to determine whether bankruptcy, federal, or state court is the proper forum”). 
 97. Id.; Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court’s Exercise 
of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 375 (2001) (characterizing 
Article I courts as “creatures of statute”). 
 98. Panahi, supra note 6 at 193. For an example of this argument, see, e.g., Alan M. 
Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of 
Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2005) (“[A] bankruptcy judge’s 
powers stem virtually exclusively from statutes.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 487, 490 (1988) (“There is general agreement that Congress has expressly 
granted very broad powers in section 105 [of the Bankruptcy Code] to judges exercising 
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.”). 
 100. See Mark Wege, Oscar N. Pinkas, & Lauren Macksoud, Does the Second Circuit in 
Sabine Have the Final Word on Texas Law?, DENTONS, Aug. 1, 2018, https://www. 
dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2018/august/1/does-the-second-circuit-in-sabine-have-the-
final-word-on-texas-law (noting that “many industry participants disagree with the New 
York courts’ application of Texas law”). 
 101. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of 
Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (discussing the frequent use of 
“melting ice cube” arguments in bankruptcy—the assertion that the company will not be 
viable for long because its assets are rapidly wasting away). 
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bankruptcy proceedings.
102
 Recall that under Butner, bankruptcy courts 
must defer to state law unless federal law dictates a different result. A 
corollary to this principle is the idea that by deferring to state law, 
bankruptcy courts must necessarily interpret and apply state law in order to 
give it proper deference. Put differently, knowing when to defer to state law 
necessitates knowing enough about state law to know when a federal 
interest dictates a different result. 
Thus, the question of whether bankruptcy courts should decide these 
issues may be important primarily as a theoretical matter. In practice, 
companies in bankruptcy often need a quick answer as to whether they can 
assume or reject agreements they entered into prepetition.
103
 Practically 
speaking then, the only viable option is for bankruptcy courts to address 
these issues when they are presented. In addition, Butner provides some 
support for the notion that bankruptcy judges will have to address state law 
issues during the course of bankruptcy proceedings. 
If we accept that bankruptcy courts must or should wade into state law 
issues in order to resolve the question of when an oil and gas conveyance 
may be assumed or rejected in bankruptcy, a further concern surfaces. 
Namely, will these bankruptcy court decisions have an outsize impact?
104
 
C. Impact 
Concern over the proper role of bankruptcy in the interpretation of oil 
and gas conveyances may be greater if the bankruptcy decisions in this area 
have a significant practical or negative impact on either the oil and gas field 
or related state law. Recently, this appeared to happen with In re Sabine Oil 
& Gas Corp.
105
 In Sabine, a bankruptcy judge sitting in New York 
interpreted Texas law to preliminarily conclude that two midstream 
                                                                                                             
 102. Butner, 440 U.S. at 57 (“[T]he basic federal rule is that state law governs.”). 
 103. Kevin P. Lombardo, The Rise of the Quickie Bankruptcy, ABFJOURNAL (Mar. 1, 
2010), https://www.abfjournal.com/articles/the-rise-of-the-quickie-bankruptcy/ (“As the 
clock ticks away, companies run a risk for further deflation of assets and in some cases, 
plummeting assets, by the very nature of the bankruptcy process.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Wege, supra note 100 (“There can be no doubt that the Second Circuit’s 
decision will change—and already has changed—the way in which the midstream industry 
operates, interacts with producers and obtains financing.”). 
 105. Gibson Dunn | In the Pipeline: Understanding Post-Sabine Midstream Contract 
Rejection Risk, , GIBSON DUNN (2019), https://www.gibsondunn.com/in-the-pipeline-
understanding-post-sabine-midstream-contract-rejection-risk/ (last visited May 6, 2020) 
("The landmark decisions in the chapter 11 case of Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation 
established both a substantive precedent and a procedural template regarding bankrupt E&P 
debtors' attempts to reject burdensome contracts with midstream service providers."). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
20 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 6 
  
 
contracts did not include covenants running with the land and could be 
rejected under §365 of the Bankruptcy Code.
106
 Both the district court and 
the Second Circuit affirmed, basing their decisions on interpretations of 
Texas law as well.
107
 Notably, Texas law is unsettled with respect to these 
issues, so the New York courts’ interpretation of these issues was not 
guided by direct Texas Supreme Court precedent.
108
 Although the outcome 
of the Sabine case “sent shockwaves through the midstream natural gas 
industry,”
109
 in fact, “the issue of whether a particular midstream agreement 
can be rejected is a fact-specific question of state law,”
110
 meaning that 
many cases involving similar questions about the proper characterization of 
oil and gas agreements may be distinguishable on their facts. 
At the same time, observers have concluded that “[t]he Sabine cases 
have had a more wide-ranging impact than they should have as decisions by 
a bankruptcy court sitting in New York interpreting Texas law.”
111
 Indeed, 
many midstream companies have tried to proactively address the issues 
raised in Sabine by making changes to their contracts.
112
 
If a bankruptcy court decision can have a significant impact on the 
industry in question, as the Sabine case seemed to, concerns about 
bankruptcy jurisdiction and uniformity may be amplified. As one 
commentator has remarked, “It is almost always better not to leave arcane 
state law interpretations in the hands of bankruptcy judges.”
113
 At the same 
time, it appears that many companies have been able to avoid raising the 
issue of contract rejection in bankruptcy court, either through restructuring 
their contracts pre-bankruptcy, or through settlement in bankruptcy.
114
 And 
of course, Sabine, like many cases that depend on interpretation of state 
law, can be limited to its facts.
115
 
                                                                                                             
 106. In re Sabine Oil and Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 79-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 107. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Sabine Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC (In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.), 734 Fed. 
Appx. 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 108. Gibson Dunn, supra note 105. 
 109. Wege, supra note 100. 
 110. Gibson Dunn, supra note 105. 
 111. Pearson, supra, note  4 at  777. 
 112. Id. at 778. 
 113. Id. at 785. 
 114. See id. at 778 et seq. (discussing ways for companies to make changes to their 
contracts); Gibson Dunn, supra note 105 (citing instances of negotiated settlements). 
 115. Epling, supra note 63 (observing that "it is quite possible to limit Sabine to its 
facts"); Irvin & Kronenberg, supra note 65 ("The Sabine ruling may have less influence than 
once feared.").  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss1/2
2020]  State Law Interpretation in Oil & Gas Bankruptcy Cases 21 
 
 
Finally, at least one observer has noted that the ability to reject 
midstream agreements may be more of a negotiating tactic than a desired 
result for most producers.
116
 That is because “the viability of the wells 
depends on transporting the hydrocarbons to market, and the most efficient 
way to do that is to use the existing midstream facilities.”
117
 Thus, while the 
threat of being able to reject a midstream agreement may be wielded in 
negotiations, it is likely that most producers and midstream companies will 
ultimately not want the agreement to be rejected.
118
 
At bottom, then, the impact of a bankruptcy court decision permitting the 
rejection of an oil and gas agreement may not be as significant as many 
commentators fear. In addition, to the extent that state law is unclear, as it 
was in Texas, state courts will have the opportunity to clear up property law 
issues as and when they arise. Finally, to the extent that there is concern 
about bankruptcy law having an outsize impact on state law or oil and gas 
practices, parties can be (and, indeed, have been) proactive in taking steps 
to achieve their desired results by, for example, modifying contract 
language or committing to a settlement in a bankruptcy case rather than 
litigating the issue. 
In short, although Sabine certainly alerted the oil and gas community that 
federal courts sitting in New York could affect the interpretation of 
midstream agreements governing Texas property, there seems to be little 
reason to be overly concerned about many cases duplicating the outcome in 
Sabine or, in general, the impact of any one bankruptcy case or court on 
these issues. As discussed, most parties are motivated not to bring these 
issues before the bankruptcy court, and the available evidence indicates that 
many have not.
119
 This may be due as much to the uncertainty due to lack 
of uniformity, discussed above, than to concerns about courts replicating 
the Sabine decision.
120
 That is because most of these cases are fact-specific, 
meaning that concerns about any one case having an outsize impact can be 
mitigated by finding ways to distinguish that case on its facts. 
  
                                                                                                             
 116. Mark Pfeiffer, Will the Pipeline Continue to Flow After Sabine? Oil and Gas 
Bankruptcies Expose Limitations in §365, 35- JUL. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 68 (July 2016). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.; see also Westbrook, supra note 44 at 316 n. 372 (observing that a debtor-lessor 
should not be able to reject, and a debtor-lessee should never want to reject an oil and gas 
lease). 
 119. Gibson Dunn, supra note 105. 
 120. See Gibson Dunn, supra note 105. 
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Conclusion 
Oil and gas bankruptcy cases raise many complex issues, and this Article 
has touched on a few of them. Although lack of uniformity, jurisdictional 
questions, and the impact of oil and gas bankruptcy cases are all seemingly 
worrisome concerns, upon closer inspection, there is perhaps less to fear 
and more to gain from bankruptcy courts’ involvement in the oil and gas 
arena. Though far from a perfect process, bankruptcy provides the 
opportunity for a debtor to address all of its creditors in one forum and to 
reassess its organizational model so that it can maximize the value of its 
assets.
121
 Such opportunity for value maximization may well be needed by 
many oil and gas companies in the near future given the extent of the 
current industry crisis. Concerns about bankruptcy court assessments of oil 
and gas contracts, when put in context, should not outweigh the other 
benefits the bankruptcy process can provide to distressed oil and gas 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 121. Califano, supra note 71 (“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, at its very core, 
allows a company facing a crisis to maximize value, preserve jobs and operations and 
weather a crisis.”). 
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